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NOTE 
JUST DESSERTS, ORA ROTTEN 
APPLE? 
WILL THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S 
DECISION IN DOE v. OTTE STAND 
TO ENSURE THAT CONVICTED 
SEX OFFENDERS ARE NOT 
EXCESSIVELY PUNISHED? 
A state statute designed to protect the public from 
criminals and criminal behavior - no matter how vile 
the crime - must comport to constitutional guarantees. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
- Judge Nathaniel R. Jones, United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit l 
Society has determined that released sex offenders are a 
class of offenders that must be watched closely by the 
community. Whether this determination is right or wrong is 
debatable. Nonetheless, every state has enacted sex offender 
registration and notification statutes that obligate convicted 
sex offenders to comply with an additional commitment after 
they have completed their criminal sentences. Although these 
statutes may have laudable goals, their punitive effects may 
actually outweigh their permissible goals. 
Most Circuit Courts of Appeal have applied the multi-
factor Mendoza-Martinez2 balancing test when analyzing 
1 Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 484 (6th Cir. 1999). 
2 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Mendoza-Martinez 
45 
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whether a sex offender registration and notification statute is 
so punitive that it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.3 One of 
the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, the excessiveness factor, 
is the most vague and yet the most important factor in deciding 
when a sex offender registration and notification statute 
constitutes punishment thereby violating the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. The excessiveness factor is examined in terms of what 
measures are excessive in relation to the goal of community 
protection. This single factor, which is susceptible to varying 
interpretations, is applied differently amongst the Circuit 
Courts of Appeal. Thus, released sex offenders are impacted to 
varying degrees depending on where the sex offender resides. 
Some of the excessive requirements, which result in the 
unlimited use of often unverifiable and inaccurate information, 
have resulted in violent attacks on innocent people and also 
extreme measures by residents of communities where the 
registered sex offender resides. For instance, a protest in 2000 
on the East Coast led to torched cars, neighbors wearing T-
shirts with slogans "pervs out" and parents making their young 
children in the late hours of the night shout "paedo, paedo" 
outside homes of registered sex offenders.4 Additionally, "lynch 
laws" exist in which people suspected of sex offenses have their 
houses destroyed by mobs.5 In one case, an innocent 78-year-
old man, who was mistaken for someone else, was one such 
person targeted by these "lynch laws."6 Furthermore, Alaska's 
Internet database includes the names of all sex offenders, half 
of whom are not convicted of offenses against children, and 
many of whom are incarcerated and thus do not pose a threat 
involved a challenge to the divestment of citizenship to American citizens. Id. at 144. 
The respondents challenged the constitutionality of the Nationality Act, 58 Stat. 746, 
and § 349 (a)(10)(1940), and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1481 
(a)(10)(1954). Id. at 144. The United States Supreme Court held that these two 
statutes were punitive and denied due process. Thus the court held that the United 
States could not divest the respondents of their citizenship. Id. at 144. 
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
4 Tracy McVeigh, Namers and Shamers Face Their Eviction with Pride, Guardian 
Unlimited, (Sept. 24, 2000) available at http://www.guardian.co.uklArchive/Article/O, 
4273,4067518,00html. 
5 Jeevan Vasagar and Julian Glover, Sex Offenders Register, Guardian Unlimited, 
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to the community. 7 Consequently, databases can lead to 
inaccurate information, vigilantism, and excessive punishment 
if not used or regulated properly. 
Every state has enacted sex offender registration and 
notification statutes that obligate convicted sex offenders to 
comply with an additional commitment after they have 
completed their criminal sentence.S By enacting Megan's Law 
in 1994, the United States Congress provided the impetus for 
these state statutes.9 In general, sex offender registration and 
notification statutes require convicted sex offenders to register 
with local authorities and provide personal information, such 
as information concerning their residency and whereabouts. 
Local authorities then maintain registries for the purpose of 
making this information about convicted sex offenders readily 
7 Ala. Dep't of Pub. Safety, Sex Offender Registration Central Registry, available 
at http://www.dps.state.ak.us.lnSorcrlhtm/banner.htm. 
8 See Carol Kunz, Toward Dispa.ssionate, Effective Control of Sex Offenders, 47 AM. 
U.L. REV. 453, 485 (1997). See also, ALA. CODE 13A-11-200 (1994); ALASKA STAT. 
12.63.010·.100, 18.65.087 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 13-3821 to -3824, 41-
1750(B) (West Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. 12-12·901 to -909 (Michie 1995); CAL. 
PENAL CODE 290-290.7 (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 18-3-412.5 (Supp. 
1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. 54-102r (Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 4120 (1995 & 
Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ch. 775.21 (Harrison Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. 42-1-12 
(1997); HAw. REV. STAT. 707 to 743 (Michie Supp. 1996) (repealed 1997); IDAHO CODE 
18-8301 to 8311 (1997); 730 ILL. COMPo STAT. 150/1 to /10.9 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); 
IND. CODE ANN. 5-2-12-1 to -13 (Michie Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. 692a.1 to .13 
(West Supp. 1997); RAN. STAT. ANN. 22-4902 to -4910 (1995 & Supp. 1996); Ky. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 17.500 to .540 (Banks· Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 15:540 to :549 
(West Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, 11101-11144 (West Supp. 1996); MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 27, 792B (1996 & Supp. 1997); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 6, 178(c)-(o) (Law 
Co-op. 1996); MICH. STAT. ANN. 4.475(1)-(12) (Law Co-op. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
243.166 (West Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. 45-33-1 to -19 (Supp. 1997); Mo. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 566-600 to -625 (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. 46-23-501 to -508 
(1995); NEB. REV. STAT. 29-4001 to -4013 (Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. 207.151 to .157 
(1995); N.H. REV. STAT. 651-B:1 to -B:9 (Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:7-1 to :7-11 
(West 1995 & Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. 29-11-A-1 to -11-8 (Michie 1997); N.Y. 
CORRECT. LAw 168 to 168-v (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. 14-208.5 to .13 
(Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2950.01 
to .99 (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, 581-587 (West 1991 & 
Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. 181.594 to .602 (1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 9791-
9799.6 (West Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAws 11-37.1-1 to -19 (1994 & Supp. 1996); S.C. 
CODE ANN. 23-3-400 to -490 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws 22-22-31 to -
39 (Michie Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. 40-39·101 to -108 (Supp. 1996); TEX. REV. 
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.l (West Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. 77-27-21.5 (1995 
& Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,5401-5413 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. 19.2-298.1 to-
298.4, 19.2-390.1 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 9A.44.130-.140 
(West Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE 61-8F-1 to -10 (1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. 175.45 (West 
Supp. 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. 7-19-301 to -306 (Michie 1995). 
9 42 U.S.C. §14071 (1994). 
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available and accessible to the public. On one extreme, these 
statutes serve the interests of public safety. At the other 
extreme, these statutes deprive released sex offenders of their 
constitutional rights. 
Within the last decade, the constitutionality of sex offender 
registration and notification provisions has come under heated 
attack. This issue will likely continue to be debated among the 
legislatures and in the courts due to the widely varying 
interpretation of the test applied to these statutes by the 
various Circuit Courts of Appeal. The Ninth Circuit and other 
Circuit Courts of Appeal have addressed both Ex Post Facto 
and Due Process challenges to these laws. To date, the United 
States Supreme Court has not weighed in on any of the 
challenges to these vastly differing state statutes. 
In Doe v. Otte,10 the Ninth Circuit addressed the 
constitutionality of Alaska's sex offender registration and 
notification statute.ll In finding that Alaska's statute violated 
the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Ninth Circuit focused on the 
legislature's intent and the statute's punitive effect in deciding 
how far a state, and more specifically Alaska, can go to inform 
its citizens of the whereabouts of released sex offenders. 
The decision of the Ninth Circuit in Doe v. Otte12 is 
important especially in terms of what the court considers 
excessive, because it varies greatly from the decisions of other 
Circuit Courts of Appeal. The Ninth Circuit held that Alaska's 
sex offender registration and notification statute was excessive 
by allowing dissemination of sex offenders' personal 
information over the Internet and requiring in-person 
registration four times a year. In contrast, other Circuit 
Courts of AppeaF3 have upheld statutes that allow Internet 
posting and excessive registration requirements based on the 
same Ex Post Facto Clause considerations. As a result, the 
Ninth Circuit has opened the door for similar challenges to sex 
offender registration and notification provisions from other 
states based on the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
10 Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001), cert granted, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 641 
(U.S. Feb. 19,2002) (No. 01·729). 
11 Id. The Ninth Circuit did not address the Due Process challenge, but rather 
decided the case on the narrower Ex Post Facto issue. Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Femedeer v. Utah Dep't. of Corr., 227 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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In Part II, this Note outlines the facts and procedural 
history of Doe v. Otte. 14 Part III discusses the history of the Ex 
Post Facto Clause and Megan's Law, and the varying Circuit 
Courts of Appeal approaches to sex offender registration and 
notification provisions. Part IV describes the Ninth Circuit's 
reasoning in Doe v. Otte. 15 Part V proposes an alternative to 
sex offender registration and notification provisions through 
supervised probation. Part V also suggests that supervised 
probation will achieve the legislative goal of community 
protection without the deprivation of the released sex offender's 
constitutional rights. Part VI concludes that the Ninth Circuit 
properly held that the Alaska Statute violated the Ex Post 
Facto Clause, and suggests that supervised probation is a 
better means of accomplishing a balance between the 
legislature's goal of community protection and the rights of 
released sex offenders. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In Rowe v. Burton,16 three plaintiffs, John Doe I, Jane 
Doe, and John Doe II, challenged the constitutionality of the 
Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (hereinafter "the Act"),17 
under both the United States and the Alaska Constitutions.18 
The plaintiffs' main challenges to the Act were based on the Ex 
Post Facto Clause and privacy rights of the United States 
Constitution. 19 The Act required all convicted sex offenders, 
even those who were convicted before the statute became 
effective, to comply with the Act's requirements.2o Among 
other things, the Act required sex offenders with two or more 
convictions to register four times per year with law 
14 Otte, 259 F.3d 979. 
15 [d. 
16 Rowe v. Burton, 844 F. Supp. 1372 (1994). Rowe v. Burton was later changed to 
Doe v. Otte on appeal. [d. 
17 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 4l. 
18 Burton, 844 F. Supp. 1372. The plaintiffs filed their claims in the United States 
District Court for the District of Alaska. [d. John Doe I initially used the pseudonym 
James Rowe, but the court changed his name to John Doe I due to a complaint by a 
real James Rowe who suffered harm because his name was easily confused and 
associated with the registered sex offender. [d. 
19 Burton, 844 F. Supp. at 1375. 
20 [d. at 1374·75. 
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enforcement agencies for the remainder of their lives.21 All 
other offenders were required to register four times per year for 
a minimum of fIfteen years.22 In addition, the Act provided for 
full disclosure to the public of information about all sex 
offenders through a central registry.23 The notification 
provisions included posting24 sex offenders' home and work 
addresses to the public at large with no limitations on who 
could obtain the information.25 
John Doe I and John Doe II were both convicted sex 
offenders.26 Jane Doe was married to John Doe I and was not 
a convicted or alleged sex offender.27 John Doe I and John Doe 
II pled no contest to the alleged sex offenses in Alaska State 
courts.28 At the time they entered their plea bargains, no sex 
offender registration requirements existed.29 John Doe I 
entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of sexual abuse of 
his daughter in 1985.30 Upon his release in 1990, the court 
made a determination that John Doe I had been successfully 
rehabilitated and granted him custody of his daughter.31 The 
court determined that John Doe I was not a pedophile and had 
a very low risk of reoffending.32 Jane Doe, John Doe 1's wife, 
alleged that her connection with John Doe I and the 
information disseminated about her husband jeopardized her 
career.33 
21 Id. at 1376. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See Otte, 259 F.3d at 981. The Act authorized posing of sex offenders' personal 
information over the Internet once the offenders completed their sentence. Id. The 
regulations provide that Alaska "will in all cases post the information from the registry 
for public viewing in print or electronic form so that it can be used by any person for 
any purpose." Id. 
25 See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit 13 § 09.050(a) (2000). 
26 Burton, 259 F.3d at 1375. 
27 Id. at 1387. 
28 Id. at 1375. 
29 See id. at 1373-75. The Act required convicted sex offenders to register personal 
information with law enforcement and authorized public disclosure of the sex offenders' 
personal information through a central registry became effective in 1994. Id. 
30 See Otte, 259 F.3d at 981. "In 1985, 9 years before the Alaska statue was enacted, 
Doe I had entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of sexual abuse of a minor after 
a court determined that he had sexually abused his daughter while she was between 
the ages of 9 and 11. Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. Jane Doe was a registered nurse in Anchorage. Id. She was well known in 
the community and alleged that releasing details of her husband's criminal history 
6
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John Doe II was convicted of sexual abuse of a 14-year-old 
child in 1984. He served his time, completed a treatment 
program for sex offenders and was released in 1990. John Doe 
II did not receive any determination that he had been 
rehabilitated. 34 
The plaintiffs filed motions seeking a preliminary 
injunction and permission to proceed under pseudonyms.35 The 
district court denied the motion to proceed under pseudonyms 
holding that the present action "does not warrant anonymity."36 
Finally, the court held that the Act did not violate the Ex Post 
Facto Clause because the state had a duty to regulate under 
the circumstances for purposes of public safety, and thus the 
Act was not punitive.37 John Doe I, Jane Doe, and John Doe II 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. 38 The Ninth Circuit granted review of the district 
court's decision that the Act did not violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.39 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE 
The Ex Post Facto Clause forbids application of any new 
punitive measures to a crime that has already been 
adjudicated.40 The Ex Post Facto Clause offers protection to 
those who commit a crime before a law is enacted with the 
purpose of prohibiting greater punishment than that allowed at 
would interfere with her professional relationships. Id. 
34 See id. at 981. John Doe II, entered a plea of nolo contendere on April 8, 1984, to 
one count of sexual abuse of a 14·year·old child. Id. 
35 Burton, 844 F. Supp at 1385. 
36 Id. at 1385·1388. Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate "exceptional" circumstances 
that would have justified proceeding under pseudonyms since the plaintiffs only sought 
to limit the dissemination of facts that were already public. Id. 
37 Id. at 1385. 
38 Otte, 259 F.3d 979. 
39 Id. 
40 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, d. 1. See also Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 
505 (1995) (finding that the decreased frequency of parole suitability hearings for 
prisoners violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, quoting Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 
39, 41 (1937), holding that a charge within statutory requirements cannot increase a 
prisoner's sentence to the maximum allowed for offences that took place before the 
enactment. To do so would be a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause). 
7
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the time the offense was committed.41 Fair notice and restraint 
of vindictive legislation are the primary goals of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause.42 Thus, before someone can be punished, they 
must first have notice of the legal consequences of such actions 
and should not be subjected to legislation that aims to punish a 
criminal beyond their initial sentence. 
To find that a statute, such as the sex offender registration 
and notification statute, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, a 
court must first determine that the effects of the statute are 
punitive.43 Only statutes that are punitive violate the Ex Post 
Facto Clause.44 If a sex offender registration and notification 
statute is not punitive, then it is merely regulatory and meant 
to balance the needs of public safety against the privacy of the 
convicted sex offender.45 
To determine whether a law is punitive, a court must 
analyze both the legislature's intent and the effect of the 
legislation under the intent-effects test.46 Under this test, if 
the legislature's intent is clearly regulatory rather than 
punitive, then the burden falls on those challenging the law to 
submit the "clearest proof that the punitive effects negate the 
state's regulatory intent."47 In order to determine the extent of 
41 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798). (Holding that a state can pass new 
laws without creating and Ex Post Facto violation since the law was not meant to 
punish). 
42 See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). The Supreme Court held that a 
statute enacted after defendant's sentence pertaining to credits for time served did not 
pertain to the defendant because the law cannot be applied retrospectively in violation 
of the Ex Post Facto Clause. [d. 
43 See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144. 
44 [d. at 168-69. 
45 See Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997). This case involved a 
convicted sex offender's challenge to Washington's Community Protection Act, WASH. 
REV. CODE § 9A.44.130 (1997) based on the Ex Post Facto Clause and privacy and due 
process challenges. [d. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the registration and 
notification provision of the statute were constitutional because the legislature did not 
indent the act to be punitive and did not support the fining that the act was excessive 
in relation to the regulatory goal of community protection. [d. 
46 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). Supreme Court's holding that 
Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act, RAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29aOI et seq. (1994), 
satisfied substantive due process requirements. [d. 
47 See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144. This test came as a result of the United 
States Supreme Court decision that a United States citizen could not be divested of 
citizenship under the Nationality Act, 58 Stat. 746 (1940), and the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1481 (a)(IO) (1952), because the statutes used to divest 
citizenship were unconstitutional. [d. The Supreme Court concluded that the statutes 
were punitive and did not provide for due process. [d. 
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the statute's punitive effects, courts usually rely on an 
examination of the Mendoza-Martinez balancing test in 
weighing the legislative purpose against the punitive effects.48 
Courts generally use the Mendoza-Martinez test to 
determine whether the effects of the law are punitive to such a 
degree that the punitive effect outweighs the legislative intent 
of public safety.49 This is the traditional test used for 
distinguishing regulatory from punitive measures.50 Under the 
Mendoza-Martinez test, the court balances seven factors, in 
light of the language used in the statute and the statute's effect 
on the offender, to determine whether the statute is punitive.51 
Those factors are: 
(1) Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint; 
(2) Whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; 
(3) Whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; 
(4) Whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment - retribution and deterrence; 
(5) Whether the behavior to which it applies is already a 
crime; 
(6) Whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally 
be connected is assignable to it; and 
(7) Whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative 
purpose assigned. 
If the punitive effects of the statute are "excessive and 
beyond that necessary to promote public safety" the court will 
find that the statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. 52 
B. MEGAN'S LAW 
In 1994, Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old girl, was abducted 
raped and murdered near her home in New Jersey.53 Jesse 
Timmendequas, the man convicted for the crimes, was 
previously convicted of two other sex offenses involving two 
48 Id. 
49 See generally, Roe v. Office of Prob., 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997), Cutshall v. 
Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999), Burr v. Snider, 234 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2000), 
and Russell v. Gregorie, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). 
60 See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169. 
51 See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 101 (1997). 
52 Kansas v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996). 
53 J.F. Sullivan, Whitman Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, at Bl. 
9
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young girls.54 No one in Megan's community was aware of 
Timmendequas's history of sex offenses. 55 
Within three months of Megan's death, the New Jersey 
legislature enacted Megan's Law, known as the Registration 
and Community Notification Law.56 This was the first sex 
offender registration and notification provision of its kind in 
the United States.57 Its purpose was to alert the community to 
the presence of sex offenders and therefore, promote the safety' 
of the community.58 
Megan's Law requires sex offenders, who have completed 
their sentences for certain designated offenses, to register with 
local police departments. 59 Registration is only to occur if the 
sex offenders' conduct at the time of sentencing was to be 
"characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive 
behavior."60 Megan's Law also created a registration 
requirement and a three-tiered notification program.61 
Additionally, Congress made the implementation of state sex 
offender registration and notification provisions a prerequisite 
for receiving certain federal funds. 62 
Currently, all states have enacted their own versions of 
Megan's Law.63 Many Circuit Courts of Appeal have 
interpreted these laws broadly, imposing restrictions on 
released sex offenders, thus allowing punishment to continue 
54 [d. 
66 [d. 
66 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to 7-11 (1994). 
67 J.F. Sullivan, Whitman Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1 1994, at B1. 
68 [d. 
59 [d. The law enforcement agencies can release "relevant and necessary 
information concerning registrants when ... necessary for public protection." 
60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to 7-11 (1994). 
61 See id. Three categories, Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 correspond to either a low, 
moderate, or high risk of recidivism. [d. Under Tier 1, the lowest risk category, 
prosecutors must notify law enforcement agencies within the sex offenders' vicinity or 
other agencies likely to encounter the sex offender. [d. Under Tier 2, the moderate risk 
category, community organizations involving the care of children, such as schools, are 
notified. [d. Under Tier 3, the high-risk category, law enforcement agencies must 
notify the public if they are likely to encounter these sex offenders. [d. 
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 14071. The Jacob Wetterling Act was established to provide 
information to the community where a sex offender resides, not to the world at large. 
[d. Further, the Jacob Wetterling Act affords due process protections such as tier 
classifications based on the risk of recidivism. Id. 
63 See supra note 12. The Ninth Circuit did not address the Due Process challenge, 
but rather decided the case on the narrower Ex Post Facto issue. [d. 
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after the released sex offender has completed his sentence.64 
Other states, most notably Washington, have narrowly 
interpreted the language of Megan's Law and have made an 
effort to balance the needs of society against the needs of the 
sex offender. 65 
C. VARYING APPROACHES TO SEX OFFENDER 
REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION STATUTES BY 
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL 
Various Circuit Courts of Appeal have interpreted the 
Mendoza-Martinez excessiveness factor and have applied the 
sex offender registration and notification statutes in widely 
varying ways. Some Circuit Courts of Appeal allow the 
dissemination of a sex offender's personal information over the 
Internet,66 while other Circuit Courts of Appeal hold that this 
type of dissemination is excessive, and therefore, violates the 
Ex Post Facto Clause.67 The varying interpretations and 
applications of sex offender registration and notification 
provisions evidence the fact that this system may not be the 
best way of ensuring uniform attempts at public safety because 
this system results in the violation of released sex offenders' 
constitutional rights. 
1. Ninth Circuit 
a. Russell v. Gregoire 
In Russell v. Gregorie,68 the Ninth Circuit addressed the Ex 
Post Facto Clause and Due Process challenges to Washington's 
Community Protection Act.69 The provisions of this statute 
imposed registration requirements on all sex offenders, 
regardless of date of conviction, and subjected some to 
64 See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997), Femedeer v. Utah Dep't of 
Corr., 227 F.3d (10th Cir. 2000), Roe v. Office of Adult Prob., 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997) 
and Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999). 
65 See Russell, 124 F.3d 1079. 
66 See Femedeer, 227 F.3d 1244. 
67 See Otte, 259 F.3d 979. 
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community notification.7° The statute applied to sex offenders 
found guilty as well as those found not guilty by reason of 
insanity.71 The release of personal information about a sex 
offender under the notification provision was limited to the 
release of information to persons living in the general vicinity 
of the offender's residence.72 Further, the statute provided for 
a tiered system of classification based on the nature of the 
initial offense and the likelihood of recidivism.73 
Willie Russell and Johnny Sterns were both convicted of 
sex related offenses in 1989.74 Both were imprisoned and 
released.75 The Washington legislature enacted the 
Community Protection Act in 1990,76 and amended the statute 
in 1994, 1995 and 1996.77 Each amendment increased the 
registration requirements imposed on sex offenders. Initially, 
the registration requirements were minimal and subjected 
some only to community notification.78 Later, the statute was 
broadened to include specific requirements imposing time 
frames within which a sex offender had to register new 
addresses and included penalties for non-compliance.79 Thus, 
Russell and Sterns claimed that the statute violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clause because the statute's requirements increased 
the initial punishment imposed at sentencing.80 
The Ninth Circuit considered the registration and 
notification provisions separately. The court first looked at the 
intent of the statute. Mter analyzing the statutory language, 
the court held that the legislature meant to regulate, not to 
punish.81 The expressed intent underlying the legislation was 
to monitor the whereabouts of sex offenders for the purpose of 
70 Id. at 1082·83. 
71 Id. at 1082. 
72 Id. at 1082·83. 
73 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082. Level one offenders were not subject to public 
notification. Id Level two offenders were subject to notification by government to law 
enforcement agencies and schools. Id. Level three had the same notification 
requirements but this information was also provided to local news media. Id. 
74 Id. at 1081. 
75 Id. 
76 Washington Community Protection Act § 9A 44.130(1). 
77 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1081. See Washington Community Protection Act § 9A 
44.130(1). 
78 Washington Community Protection Act § 9A 44.130(1). 
79 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 1087. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss1/5
2002] SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION STATUTES 57 
public safety, not to impose additional punishment upon their 
release.82 
Since the legislature's intent was clearly regulatory, the· 
court considered whether there was the clearest proof that the 
punitive effects of the statute outweighed the legislative goal of 
community protection. The court analyzed the Mendoza-
Martinez factors and found that none of the factors supported 
the conclusion that the effects of the Act were punitive.83 The 
court found no affIrmative disability or restraint, found the 
registration aspect to be regulatory, found that the statute did 
not serve retributive purposes and found that the statute was 
not excessive in relation to the state's interest of public 
protection.84 The court concluded that the statute's punitive 
effects were "not so egregious as to prevent us from viewing the 
Act as regulatory or remedial."85 Further, the court noted that, 
"the harsh results of notifIcation come not as a result of 
government action, but as a societal consequence of the 
offender's crime."86 
b. Neal v. Shimoda 
In Neal v. Shimoda,87 A. J. Neal and Marshall Martinez 
claimed that Hawaii's sex offender treatment program violated 
the Ex Post Facto Clause.88 The Ninth Circuit's decision in this 
case expanded the application of sex offender registration 
statutes to those who have never been convicted of sex related 
offenses. Hawaii's guidelines for the treatment program 
resulted from the legislature's conclusion that "sexual assault 
is a heinous crime committed by offenders with deviant 
behavior patterns that cannot be controlled by incarceration 
alone."89 
In 1993, Neal was charged with sex offenses, but those 
charges were dismissed when he entered a plea agreement 
82 Id. 
sa Id. at 1089. The court compared the statute's registration requirements to those 
in other statutes which have been found to be constitutional by other courts. Id. 
B4 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1089. 
B5 Id. at 1092. 
B6 Id. at 1092. 
87 Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997). 
BB Id. at 821. 
89 See id., citing 1992 HAW. SESS. LAws 304-305. 
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based on other related non-sexual charges.9o Although Neal 
was never convicted of any sex related offenses, he was 
classified as a sex offender during his incarceration in order to 
allow him to ''benefit from sex offender treatment."91 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the narrowly 
constructed statute was not excessive in relation to the goal of 
community protection, was constitutional and thus did not 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.92 This decision provided the 
basis for comparison in Doe v. Otte93 and cases in other Circuit 
Courts of Appeal in regards to what requirements in a sex 
offender registration and notification are permissible. 
Martinez had two prior sex related offenses and was 
previously convicted of attempted rape and kidnapping.94 
Martinez was sentenced to a prison term and became eligible 
for parole in 1998.95 Martinez was classified as a sex offender, 
but refused to participate in the prison's treatment program.96 
Neal and Martinez brought separate claims challenging 
the treatment program under the Ex Post Facto Clause, on the 
basis that the policy under which they were classified and 
treated as sex offenders was created after they were 
convicted.97 Both claimed that the classification made them 
ineligible for parole and imposed an additional punishment, 
thereby violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.98 
Judge Nelson wrote the majority opinion for the Ninth 
Circuit, with Judge Reinhardt dissenting. Judge Nelson relied 
on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Kansas v. 
Hendricks,99 which held that the prison's classification system 
90 See Neal, 131 F.3d at 822. Neal was charged with sexual assault in the flrst 
degree, terrorist threats and attempted murder. Id. Neal was not found guilty of 
sexual assault, but rather plead to terrorist threats and attempted murder in exchange 
for the dismissal of the sexual assault charge. Id. 
91 Id. at 822. 
92 Id. at 1093. 
93 Otte, 259 F.3d 979. 
94 Id. at 822-23. 
95 Id. at 823. 
96 Id. 
97 Neal, 131 F.3d at 823. 
98 Id. at 821. The two cases were consolidated for the appeal to the Ninth Circuit 
because of the similarity in Neal's and Martinez's claims. Id. 
99 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 346. This case upheld Kansas's Sexually Violent 
Predator Act which implemented involuntary civil commitment for sex offenders likely 
to re-offend and declared these individuals to be sexually violent predators. Id. 
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in Kansas did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.1°o Judge 
Nelson held that the mandatory treatment programs did not 
constitute punishment because of their rehabilitative 
purpose.101 He rationalized the denial of parole to Neal and 
Martinez under the classification as necessary for them to 
complete the treatment program.102 
Judge Reinhardt dissented, stating that the classifications 
did violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.103 He noted that the 
delay in parole eligibility resulted in substantially adverse 
effects on those to whom the program applied.104 He concluded 
that the terms and conditions of Neal's and Martinez's parole 
dates were unlawfully changed by the application of the sex 
offender treatment program's provisions and thus violated the 
Ex Post Facto Clause.105 In reaching that conclusion, Judge 
Reinhardt noted that the most glaring error in the majority's 
opinion, especially in Neal's case, was that a court never 
determined that he was a sex offender.106 
Judge Reinhardt was also distressed by the Hawaii's 
prison officials' practice of basing the classifications on past 
acts rather than on the current threat of the inmate.107 The 
distinguishing feature between the Kansas and Hawaii 
statutes is that the Kansas statute provided for rehabilitation 
through a long-term treatment program for sex offenders and 
segregated them from the general prison population for 
purposes of treatment. In contrast, Hawaii's statute is 
excessive because it maintains sex offenders in the general 
population and imposes additional punishment through denial 
of parole and extended incarceration. lOB 
While the Mendoza-Martinez factors were not specifically 
applied in this case, the majority's central focus was on 
whether the statute was excessive. Thus, the Ninth Circuit in 
Russell109 and Nealllo came to differing conclusions. The Act in 
100 Neal, 131 F.3d at 825. 
101 [d. at 827. 
102 [d. 
103 [d. at 834. 
104 [d. at 834-35. 
105 Neal, 131 F.3d at 834-35. 
106 [d. at 835. 
107 [d. 
108 [d. at 835-36. 
109 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1079. 
15
Miles: Sex Offender Registration Statutes
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
60 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
Russelllll was upheld based on the statute's narrow 
construction which limited the requirements imposed on the 
released sex offender. To the contrary, the sex offender 
treatment program in Nea11l2 was upheld even though it was 
broadly constructed and expanded the state's powers to 
continue to punish under the guise of a sex offender 
registration and notification statute. Consequently, the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Neal113 has broadened the state's powers 
beyond the dictates of Megan's law, while Russell114 set clearer 
and more limited parameters on the reach of sex offender 
registration and notification requirements. 
2. Tenth Circuit 
In Femedeer v. Utah Department of Corrections,115 the 
Tenth Circuit examined the constitutionality of Utah's sex 
offender registration and notification statute.116 Femedeer 
challenged the constitutionality of Utah's statute under the Ex 
Post Facto Clause.117 
The Tenth Circuit analyzed whether the legislature 
intended to create a civil remedy or a criminal penalty.118 The 
court analyzed the placement of the statute in the civil code, 
rather than criminal code, and concluded that this was 
evidence of the legislature's nonpunitive intent.119 Further, the 
court held that access to information over the Internet was to 
furnish the general public with easy access to information to 
enable citizens to assist with police investigations.12o The 
110 Neal, 131 F.3d at 818. 
111 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1079. 
112 Neal, 131 F.3d at 818. 
113 [d. 
114 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1079. 
115 Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1244. 
116 See id. In 1998, Utah amended its sex offender registration and notification 
statute to apply to all convicted sex offenders regardless of date of conviction and 
eliminated all geographic restrictions on the notification provision. [d. The increase in 
the number of requests for information about registered sex offenders, specifically 
100,000 requests from Boy Scouts of America checking into the background of its 
volunteers, created a backlog. [d. To remedy this problem, the Department of 
Corrections allowed unlimited access to information through its website. [d. 
117 [d. at 1246. 
118 [d. at 1248-49. 
119 [d. at 1249. 
120 Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249. 
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Tenth Circuit found that Internet notification was "clearly a 
civil remedy."121 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that 
the legislature intended to protect the public rather than to 
punish. 122 
Since the Tenth Circuit concluded that the legislature had 
an unambiguous, nonpunitive intent, the court examined 
whether Femedeer had shown the "clearest proof' that the 
punitive effects outweighed the legislature's regulatory 
intent. 123 In doing so, the court relied on the Mendoza-
Martinez factors.124 
First, the Tenth Circuit found that the statute did not 
impose an affirmative disability or restraint because 
registrants were free to choose a place to live and work and 
were "free to come and go as they please."125 The court found 
that Utah's statute, like Washington's statute, imposed no 
affirmative disability,126 Unlike the Washington statute, 
however, which provided information in only specified 
geographic areas, the Utah statute provided information about 
registered sex offenders worldwide,127 Further, the Tenth 
Circuit determined that access to unlimited information about 
convicted sex offenders over the Internet is not analogous to 
public shaming and thus does not equate with historical 
punishment,128 The court emphasized that the information 
released was true and accurate.129 Although the court 
acknowledged that allowing access to such information has 
"substantial negative consequences involved," nevertheless, it 
has never been regarded as punishment.13o 
Next, the court found that application of Utah's statute 
was not dependent on the finding of scienter because all sex 
offenders, whether convicted or committed to mental 
institutions for their crimes, were subject to the registration 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 1249-50. 
124 Id. 
125 Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1250. 
126 Id. at 1250. 
127 See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1089. 
128 Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1250-51. 
129 Id. at 1251. 
130 Id. 
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and notification provisions.131 The court was unable to 
determine whether the statute promoted retribution and 
deterrence, the traditional aims of punishment, and held that 
this element of the Mendoza-Martinez test was 
"inconclusive."132 Although the court acknowledged that the 
statute applied to behavior that was already a crime, it did not 
give much weight to this factor. Rather, the court concluded 
that the statute's purpose was to prevent future crime, 
specifically sex offenses. 133 Thus, the civil, non -punitive 
purpose of promoting public safety outweighed the statute's 
application to behavior already deemed criminal. l34 
Finally, the court considered the excessiveness factor. The 
court acknowledged that the negative impact of disseminating 
information over the Internet- was great. The court, however, 
was confident that few inquiries would be made since "the 
farther removed one is from a sex offender's community ... the 
less likely one will be to have an interest in accessing this 
particular registry."135 Accordingly, the court concluded that 
the statute was not excessive in relation to its public safety 
goals, and therefore, did not violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.136 Thus, the Tenth Circuit expanded the scope of 
limited community notification provided for by Megan's Law, to 
include world-wide access to a registered sex offender's 
personal information over the Internet. 
In upholding Utah's sex offender notification scheme, 
Tenth Circuit dealt a crushing blow to Due Process and Ex Post 
Facto rights for convicted sex offenders. Thus, the Tenth 
Circuit has broadened sex offender registration and notification 
prOVISIOn to the greatest extent by concluding that 
dissemination of sex offenders' information worldwide, over the 
Internet, is an appropriate avenue for assuring public safety 
and was not excessive punishment. 
131 [d. at 1252. 
132 [d. at 1251-52. 
133 Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1252. 
134 [d. 
135 [d. at 1253. 
136 [d. The Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision which found the 
statute unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause. [d. Note that this is the 
exact opposite holding from Otte, which concluded that unlimited access to information 
over the Internet is excessive and thus punitive. [d. 
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3. Fifth Circuit 
In Moore v. Avoyelles Correctional Center,137 the Fifth 
Circuit closely followed the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Russell. 138 Moore contended that Louisiana's sex offender 
statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by subjecting him to 
a sex offender registration and notification law that was 
enacted after he was convicted of indecent behavior with a 
minor.139 Moore's five-year prison sentence was suspended and 
Moore was placed on probation.140 One of the conditions of his 
probation required him to register as a sex offender.14l 
The Fifth Circuit applied the intent-effects test used in 
Russell142 and compared Louisiana's statute to other states' 
statutes, including those in Washington and Connecticut. The 
court concluded that Louisiana's statute did not impose 
punishment and was not excessive to the extent that it violated 
the Ex Post Facto Clause.143 The court found that the language 
of Louisiana's statute closely mirrored the language of the 
Washington statute. Therefore, the legislature's intent was 
clearly to protect the public from recidivist sex offenders.144 
Without applying the seven factors from the Mendoza-
Martinez effects test, the Court concluded that Moore failed to 
satisfy the clearest proof standard because he failed to show 
that the statute was so punitive or excessive that it outweighed 
the legislature's non-punitive intent. 145 Thus, this decision is 
in line with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Russell by holding 
that if the statute is narrowly construed then it will not be 
considered excessive or punitive under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. 
137 Moore v. Avoyelles Corr. Ctr, 253 F.3d 870 (5th Cir. 2001). 
138 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1079. 
139 Moore, 253 F.3d at 871. 
140 [d. 
141 See id. A condition of Moore's probation was a requirement that he register his 
personal information with law enforcement. [d. The statute required released sex 
offenders to notify their neighbors of their residence and sex offender status. [d. 
142 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1079. 
143 Moore, 253 F.3d at 872-73. 
144 [d. at 873. 
145 [d. at 872-73. 
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4. Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit, in Roe u. Office of Adult Probation, 146 
considered an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge to an internal 
sex offender notification policy of a Connecticut state agency, 
the Probation Department. 147 The issues before the court were 
whether the agency policy should apply to those sex offenders 
whose crimes took place before the enactment of the policy and 
whether the policy constituted punishment.148 Thus, the court 
addressed the constitutionality of the probation department's 
sex offender notification policy on Ex Post Facto grounds.149 
Roe was convicted of six counts of sexual assault against a 
minor in 1991.150 He was released on parole in August 1994.151 
In approximately November 1994, Roe's parole was revoked 
and he was returned to prison.152 He was released again and 
placed on probation in 1995, at which time the probation 
department concluded that Roe had a high rate of re-
offending. 153 
The agency policy allowed for public notification of the sex 
offenders' criminal records while under the supervision of a 
probation officer.154 Prior to the implementation of the Adult 
Probation Sex Offender Notification Policy, Connecticut's 
legislature enacted a sex offender registration scheme in 1994, 
that only applied to those persons convicted of seven specified 
offenses after January 1, 1995.155 In 1995, the statute was 
broadened to provide for notification to specific people in the 
registrant's vicinity.156 In 1997, the statute was broadened 
again, requiring all sex offenders to comply with the 
146 Roe, 125 F.3d 47. 
147 Id. at 48. Considering sex offender notification through an internal state agency 
policy rather than the implementation through a Connecticut statute. Id. 
148 Id. Police, victims, victim's parent and guardian received information about sex 
offenders' change of address or changed in conditions of probation. Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 51. 
151 Roe, 125 F.3d at 51. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 51. 
154 Id. at 50. 
155 Id. at 47. 
156 Roe, 125 F.3d at 49. The sex offenders' personal information could be disclosed to 
"'any specific person if such disclosure is deemed necessary by the chief of police ... to 
protect said person from any person subject to' "registration. Id. 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss1/5
2002] SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION STATUTES 65 
registration requirements regardless of conviction date and 
authorizing unlimited notification.157 
In analyzing whether the policy was punitive, the Second 
Circuit used the intent-effects analysis.158 The court noted that 
the Probation Department's primary intention was to protect 
the public from the sex offenders under its supervision and to 
aid in their rehabilitation.159 The court also found that the 
policy was regulatory, rather than punitive.160 In applying the 
clearest proof standard, the court determined that any punitive 
effects of the policy were outweighed by the policy's goals of 
community protection.16l Although the district court applied 
the Mendoza-Martinez test and determined the policy was 
punitive, the Second Circuit applied the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors and decided that the policy was not punitive based on 
the same criteria.162 The Second Circuit held that Roe failed to 
establish the clearest proof that the notification policy was 
punitive. Further, the court held that the policy was "not 
excessive in relation to its purpose of enhancing public 
awareness and helping to prevent the recovering offender from 
harmful relapses."163 
The Second Circuit in Roe v. Office of Adult Probation164 
upheld the constitutionality of the internal state policy 
provision, despite the retroactive application of the provisions 
to sex offenders. Clearly, the Second Circuit's decision 
evidences the trend to broaden sex offender registration and 
notification provisions to apply to those whose crimes took 
place before the statute was enacted. 
5. Sixth Circuit 
In Cutshall v. Sundquist,165 the Sixth Circuit reviewed the 
Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring Act166 
157 Id. at 49·50. 
158 Id. at 53. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Roe, 125 F.3d at 54-55. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 55. 
164 Roe, 125 F.3d at 47. 
165 Cutshall, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999). 
168 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-101 - 40-39-110 (2001). 
21
Miles: Sex Offender Registration Statutes
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
66 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
which required released sex offenders to register with law 
enforcement agencies and allowed the information to be 
disseminated to the public. 167 Cutshall challenged the 
constitutionality of the registration and notification provisions 
of the Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring 
Act, arguing that the sex offender registration and notification 
provisions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.16s 
The Act required Cutshall to register personal information 
with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation following discharge 
from incarceration. 169 Further, the Act authorized the 
maintenance of a registry for law enforcement to keep track of 
sex offenders.170 Cutshall claimed these provisions punished 
him twice for the same offense, and alleged that the legislature 
intended to further punish sex offenders in addition to their 
sentences of incarceration, through the Act.171 He also argued 
that the maintenance of the central registry did not serve the 
state's alleged purpose of aiding law enforcement, but rather 
that the effects of the registry were punitive.172 
In Cutshall,173 the district court had found that the 
registration provision was constitutional. The court, however, 
found that the notification provision violated Cutshall's 
constitutional right to Due Process. The court reasoned that 
Cutshall was denied an opportunity to challenge the 
dissemination of the information that he was required to 
provide to the central registry.174 
The Sixth Circuit analyzed Cutshall's Ex Post Facto 
Clause and Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy challenges 
simultaneously, upholding the district court's Ex Post Facto 
determination, but reversing on Due Process grounds.175 First, 
the court looked at the intent behind the Tennessee Act.176 
167 Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 469. 
168 Id. Cutshall also argued that the registration and notification provisions also 
violated other constitutional violations such as substantive and procedural due process, 
right to privacy. and equal protection Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 472. 
172 Id. 
173 Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 1079. 
174 Id. at 469. 
175 Id. at 474. 
176 Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-
39-101 - 40-39-110 (2001). 
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Mter analyzing the language of the statute, the court 
concluded that the statute was regulatory in nature since the 
intent underlying the statute was to assist law enforcement 
and to protect the public.177 
Next, the Sixth Circuit analyzed the effects of the statute 
under the Mendoza-Martinez factors to determine whether the 
punitive effects significantly outweighed the regulatory intent 
so as to constitute punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.178 The court found that the statute did not impose any 
restraint on registrants because they were not incarcerated, 
did not lose their livelihood, and were not deprived of a driver's 
license like those convicted of less serious crimes.179 The court 
also noted that registration and notification requirements did 
not constitute historical punishment because they did not 
impose imprisonment, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.180 
Application of the Tennessee Act did not depend on the finding 
of scienter because the statute did not require a cUlpable mens 
rea. 181 The court found that the statute probably served 
traditional aims of punishment, such as deterrence, but stated 
that this was not dispositive of the punitive nature of the 
statute.182 Although the statute applied to acts that were 
already crimes, the court found that the statute was still more 
regulatory than punitive. 183 Finally, the court combined the 
last two Mendoza-Martinez factors and determined that the 
statute's requirements were minimal in comparison to the 
benefit from regulation.184 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Jones stated that, "a state 
statute designed to protect the public from criminals and 
criminal behavior - no matter how vile the crime - must 
comport with constitutional guarantees."185 Judge Jones was 
primarily concerned with the denial of due process based on the 
177 Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 474. 
178 [d. at 474·477. The court applied the clearest proof standard because it 
determined that the statute's intent was regulatory based on the limited disclosure, the 
intent to protect the public, and the minimal reporting requirements. 
179 [d. at 474. 
180 [d. at 475. 
181 [d. The statute applied to those found guilty of a sex related offense as well as 
those found not guilt by reason of insanity. [d. 
182 Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 475. 
183 [d. 
184 [d. at 476. 
185 [d. at 484. 
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fact that the statute treated all offenders alike, regardless of 
the severity of the crime or the risk of recidivism.186 Thus, 
when a statute fails to categorize according to the severity of 
the crime, the offender's threat to the public cannot be 
accurately determined.187 If the primary aim of the law is to 
protect the public, an offender must have the right to a court's 
determination of the likelihood of recidivism before the offender 
is required to register. 188 
The Sixth Circuit concluded that Tennessee's sex offender 
registration statute was not punitive and, therefore, did not 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.189 This decision did not 
broaden the dictates of Megan's Law, but did validate the 
actions taken by the state to control released sex offenders. 
6. Eight Circuit 
In Burr v. Snider,190 Burr claimed that North Dakota's sex 
offender registration statute,19l which required address 
registration by convicted sex offenders, imposed an excessive 
punishment on a released sex offender.192 Burr pled guilty to 
violating this statute when he failed to notify the police of his 
new address.193 He claimed that the statute improperly 
authorized dissemination of sex offender information to the 
public. Burr further argued that this dissemination of 
information constituted punishment that was not imposed at 
the time the offender was originally sentenced, and thus 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.194 
The Eight Circuit first analyzed the statute under the 
intent-effects test. 195 The court examined the legislative 
history of the statute and concluded that the legislature did not 
intend the registration requirement to constitute a punitive 
186 Id. 
187 Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 484. 
188 Id. 
189 Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 466. The court also found the statute constitutional under 
the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy. Id. 
190 Burr v. Snider, 234 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2000). 
191 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1·32·15(3) (1999). 
192 Burr, 234 F.3d at 1052. 
193 Id. at 1053. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 1054. 
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measure.196 The court based its conclusion on the lack of 
evidence that indicated that the registration requirement was 
being used to punish. 197 The court found that the legislature 
did not intend to increase the offenders' initial penalty, and 
therefore, did not intend to punish.19B 
Next, the court considered whether the statute was 
punitive under the Mendoza-Martinez effects test.199 Taken as 
a whole, the court stated that any punitive effects of the statute 
were not outweighed by the legislature's intent to protect 
communities from convicted sex offenders.20o Furthermore, the 
court found that the statute did not impose an affirmative 
disability or restraint, did not promote the traditional aims of 
punishment, but did further the legitimate interest of public 
protection. 201 The court, however, failed to substantiate the 
claim that these provisions actually protect the community. 
Accordingly, Burr202 has also followed the nationwide trend of 
upholding sex offender registration and notifications statues 
under the guise of community protection. 
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit held that North Dakota's 
sex offender registration statute, which required sex offenders 
to notify police upon changing their residence, did not 
constitute punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause.203 The 
court found that requiring sex offenders to keep police informed 
of their whereabouts when they move was not excessively 
punitive.204 The penalty imposed for violation of this provision, 
according to the Eighth Circuit, did not create an additional 
punishment in relation to the original sentence, and therefore 
did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Thus, this case is in 
line with the dictates of Megan's Law and has validated the 
196 Id. See also Burr v. Snider, 598 N.W. 2d at 152-53 (1998). The Eight Circuit 
looked to the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision for guidance on the statue's 
legislative history. Burr, 234 F.3d at 1052. 
197 Burr, 234 F.3d at 1054. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the statute was not punitive 
under the Mendoza-Martinez effects test. Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit 
acknowledged that this test "usually involves a certain degree of judicial discretion." 
Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. Thus, the Eighth Circuit found that the North Dakota Supreme Court's 
analysis was reasonable under the facts of this case. Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Burr, 234 F.3d at 1055. 
204 Id. 
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state's application of the sex offender registration and 
notification requirements. 
The Circuit Courts of Appeal remain in conflict about what 
constitutes punishment and what regulations promote public 
safety. Notably, the Ninth Circuit's decisions in cases 
involving sex offender registration and notification are also 
inconsistent. The Ninth Circuit's decisions in Otte,205 
Russell,206 and Neal,207 when considered collectively, evidence 
the differences in the outcomes of the cases depending on which 
Judge authored the decision. Judge Reinhardt, writing for the 
majority in Otte,208 established greater protections for released 
sex offenders by holding that the Alaska Act violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clause.209 Judge Reinhardt in Otte21O held that 
Internet publication of sex offenders' personal information and 
the Act's extensive registration requirements were clearly 
excessive and thus punitive. Judge O'Scannlon wrote a more 
conservative decision in Russell,211 but nevertheless followed 
the guidelines set forth in Megan's Law. Lastly, Judge Nelson 
wrote the most conservative decision of the three judges by 
upholding the application of sex offender registration 
requirements in Neal212 to those who have not been convicted of 
sex offenses. Thus, due to the conflicting decisions among the 
Circuits, as well as within the Ninth Circuit itself, the line 
between when regulations constitute punishment and what 
regulations intend to promote public safety remains unclear. 
IV. NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS OF DOE v. OTTE 
In Doe v. Otte,213 the Ninth Circuit considered whether 
Alaska's sex offender registration and notification provisions 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
205 Dtte, 259 F.3d at 979. 
206 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1081. 
207 Neal, 131 F.3d at 818. 
208 Otte, 259 F.3d at 979. 
209 See infra Part IV. 
210 [d. 
211 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087. 
212 Neal, 131 F.3d at 818. 
213 Dtte, 259 F.3d at 979. When the initial complaint was files, John Doe I chose the 
pseudonym "James Rowe." After complaints from an individual named James Rowe, 
the court changed the pseudonym to John Doe. [d. 
26
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Constitution.214 Specifically, the court focused on the varying 
degrees of registration and notification requirements contained 
in the statute, especially the provision that allowed the 
dissemination of sex offender personal information over the 
Internet. The court determined that the statute was excessive 
and, thus unconstitutional because it violated the Ex Post 
Facto Clause.215 
A. INTENT TEST 
The plaintiffs in Doe v. Otte,216 claimed that the Act was 
punitive, and therefore, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
First, the court examined the Act under the intent-effects 
test.217 The intent prong of the test states that if the 
legislature's intent is to punish, then the law must be struck 
down.218 If the legislature's intent is not punitive, then the 
court must determine if the punitive effects outweigh the 
legislative goal of community protection.219 
The court determined that the Alaska legislature's intent 
was non-punitive.220 The court concluded that the placement of 
the Act in the criminal code was not necessarily determinative 
of the legislature's intent to punish.221 The court also 
considered the legislative findings in concluding that the Act 
was non-punitive.222 Thus, the court moved on to consider the 
Mendoza-Martinez factors.223 
B. EFFECTS TEST - MENDOZA-MARTINEZ FACTORS 
Next, the court used the Mendoza-Martinez test to decide if 
the punitive effects of the Act were so egregious that it violated 
the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court explicitly did not apply 
the clearest proof standard, which is only used when the 
legislature's intent IS clearly regulatory, because the 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 982. 
216 Id. at 986. 
217 Id. at 986-88, See also Russell, 124 F.3d at 1086. 
218 See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1079. 
219 Otte, 259 F.3d at 985-95, citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. 
220 Id. at 986-89. 
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legislature's intent in this instance was ambiguous.224 The 
court examined the seven criteria set forth in the Mendoza-
Martinez test to determine the extent to which the punitive 
effects outweighed any regulatory intent.225 
1. The Act is Punitive if it Results in Affirmative Disability or 
Restraint 
The court first considered whether the Act imposed an 
affirmative disability or restraint on the convicted sex 
offender. 226 To find that a sex offender registration and 
notification statute imposes an affirmative disability or 
restraint, the statute must not impose any more burdens than 
necessary to accomplish its goal of community protection. 227 
The court closely compared the disabilities and restraints 
imposed by the Washington statute in Russell228 with those 
imposed by the Act.229 While both statutes required 
registration upon release, the Act's registration requirements 
were vastly more burdensome.23o The Act required released 
sex offenders to register four times a year for a minimum of 
fifteen years and a maximum of life.231 In contrast, the 
Washington statute only required a one-time registration.232 
The Ninth Circuit held that the Act's registration and 
notification provisions imposed significant disabilities on the 
convicted sex offender. The notification provision was 
excessive because the posting of the convicted sex offender's 
information on the Internet subjects the sex offender and his 
family "to community obloquy and scorn that damage them 
personally and professionally."233 
224 [d. at 985. See also Russell, 124 F.3d at 1086. The "clearest proof standard", is a 
high standard that is only imposed on the party challenging the statute when the 
legislative intent is clearly regulatory. [d. 
225 Otte, at 259 F.3d at 986-95. See also Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169. 
226 Otte, 259 F.3d at 987-89. 
227 [d. 
228 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1079. 
229 Otte, 259 F.3d. at 987-89. 
230 [d. at 989. 
231 See id. Other requirements of Alaska's statue included, appearing in person at 
law enforcement agencies and providing home address, work address, vehicle 
registration, and disclose the nature of any mental health treatment. 
232 [d. at 987. 
233 [d. 
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Accordingly, the court concluded that the burdensome 
registration and notification requirements under the Act 
imposed an affirmative disability and restraint.234 The Act did 
not limit the dissemination of information to specific 
geographic areas, but rather publicized the convicted sex 
offender's information over the Internet.235 The Act also did 
not take into account the sex offender's likelihood of 
recidivism.236 Accordingly, this factor demonstrated that the 
statute had a punitive effect because it imposed substantial 
disabilities on convicted sex offenders.237 
2. The Act is Punitive if it is Historically Regarded as 
Punishment 
The court next addressed the issue of whether sex offender 
registration acts have historically been regarded as punitive.238 
Because similar statutes have been in place for less than a 
decade, the court focused on the decisions of lower courts.239 
Specifically, the court compared the Alaska Act to the 
Washington statute,240 and concluded that neither statute was 
meant to punish.241 The court also found that the statutes 
were not analogous to historical forms of shaming 
punishment.242 Therefore, this factor favored characterizing 
the Act as non-punitive. 
234 Otte, 259 F.3d at 987. The Court in Russell upheld the Washington statute 
because the law was narrowly tailored to serve the interest of public protection and had 
only minimal imposition on the sex offender. 
235 [d. at 988. 
236 [d. 
237 [d. at 989. 
238 See id. at 989. The Court noted that some of the offenses that triggered 
application of the Act were "strict liability" offenses that are committed whether or not 
the defendant is aware that his conduct is criminal (e.g. statutory rape). [d. 
239 See Otte, 259 F.3d at 989, citing Alan R. Kabat, Note, Scarlet Letter Sex Offender 
Databases and Community Notification; Sacrificing Personal Privacy for a Symbol's 
Sake, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 333, 334·55 (1998). 
240 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092. 
241 Otte, 259 F.3d at 989. 
242 [d. See also Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092, (acknowledging that there is no historical 
antecedent to sex offender registration and notification provision). [d. The closest 
analogy to the notification provision is "wanted" posters for dangerous persons. [d. 
Although the court states that the notification provisions carry a great risk of 
vigilantism, the court maintains that they are not historically regarded as punitive. [d. 
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3. The Act is Punitive if it Applies Only upon the Finding of 
Scienter 
The third issue addressed by the court was whether the 
Act comes into play only upon the finding of scienter. The 
court noted that the Act's requirements were imposed on those 
offenders without knowledge that their actions were a crime, 
such as those found mentally incompetent, as well as those who 
had the necessary mens rea.243 Accordingly, because the court 
found that application of the Act was not dependent on a 
finding of scienter, this factor supported the conclusion that the 
Act was not punitive.244 
4. The Act is Punitive if it Promotes Traditional Aims of 
Punishment 
The court next determined whether the Act specifically 
promoted the aims of retribution and deterrence, the 
traditional aims of punishment.245 The court found that the 
registration and notification provisions of the Act were 
retributive because of the excessive obligations imposed on sex 
offenders.246 These provisions required frequent contact with 
the police department over a minimum of fifteen years, and 
therefore were excessive.247 
The court again compared the Act to the Washington 
statute in Russell248 and found that the Washington statute 
"may implicate deterrence," and similarly the Act had its own 
deterrent effect.249 Unlike the Washington Statute, the Act's 
"onerous" registration obligations were inherently punitive.250 
In reaching this conclusion, the court analogized the 
243 Qtte, 259 F.3d at 989. 
244 Id. 
246 Id. at 989-91. 
246 Id. at 990. 
247 Id. 
248 See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082-83. 
249 Qtte, 259 F.3d at 990, See also Russell, 124 F.3d at 1091. The Washington statute 
required convicted sex offenders to register with local law enforcement authorities and 
subjected some to community notification. Id. The statute required registration within 
twenty-four hours of release and to notify of change of address. Id. The notification 
element required that a public agency must have some evidence of an offender's future 
dangerousness or likelihood of recidivism in order to justify disclosure. Id. Further 
dissemination was restricted to narrow geographic areas. 
260 Qtte, 259 F.3d at 990. 
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registration requirements with supervised probation in the 
respect that both required regular reports to law enforcement, 
and concluded that this supported the conclusion that the 
requirements were punitive.251 The court also noted that the 
registration requirements did not differentiate between the 
gravity of the offender's initial offense and the potential of risk 
to the community.252 Overall, the court found that the Act 
furthered the traditional aims of retribution and deterrence. 
Therefore, the court determined that this factor also supported 
the conclusion that the Act was punitive.253 
5. The Act is Punitive if the Behavior to which the Act Applies is 
Already a Crime 
Next, the court examined whether the behavior to which 
the Act applies was already criminal in nature.254 Since the 
Act applied only to those found guilty, it followed that 
imposition of the Act's requirements depended on an actual 
conviction. 255 In contrast, the Court noted that the 
Washington statute in Russell,256 which the Ninth Circuit 
concluded was non-punitive, applied to sex offenders whether 
or not they had been convicted.257 Specifically, the Washington 
statute subjected those sex offenders who were incompetent to 
stand trial and persons found not guilty by reason of insanity 
to its registration and notification requirements.258 In 
contrast, because the Act's requirements were only imposed on 
those who had been convicted in a court oflaw and not to those 
found not guilty by reason of mental impairment, the court 
found this factor demonstrated that the Act was punitive.259 
251 [d. at 991. 
252 [d. at 990. 
253 [d. at 99l. 
254 [d. 
255 Otte, 259 F.3d at 991. 
256 See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082. 
257 Otte, 259 F.3d at 991. See also Russell, 124 F.3d at 1091. The Ninth Circuit made 
frequent reference to the Washington statute and used this as a means of comparison 
in analyzing the Alaska Act. [d. 
256 See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found the Tenth 
Circuit's holding that Utah's Sex Offender Notification Act was not punitive because it 
also applied to those offenders found not guilty because of a mental impairment. [d. 
259 Otte, 259 F.3d at 991. 
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6. The Act is Punitive Unless the Non-Punitive Purposes 
Outweigh the Punitive Effects 
The sixth factor the court considered in determining if the 
Act was punitive was whether the Act's non-punitive purpose, 
that is public safety, outweighed the punitive purpose of the 
registration and notification.260 The court found that the Act 
legitimately and reasonably served the non-punitive purpose of 
public safety. 
7. The Act is Punitive if the Act is Excessive in Relation to 
Purpose 
Lastly, the court addressed the issue of whether the Act's 
registration and notification provisions were excessive in 
relation to the public safety interests advanced by the Act.261 
The court stated that the excessiveness factor is the most 
telling and significant evidence of whether a statute is 
punitive.262 Sex offender registration and notification statutes 
cannot impose requirements that are excessive in relation to 
the legislature's intended purpose.263 
Again, the court compared the Act to the Washington 
statute and found that the Act was excessive in comparison to 
the more narrowly constructed requirements imposed by the 
Washington statute.264 The Alaska legislature made no 
attempt to classify sex offenders by degrees to which they posed 
future risk, but rather applied a blanket punishment on all 
offenders.265 Notably, a judicial determination of rehabilitation 
was irrelevant under the Act.266 Furthermore, the court found 
the statute was "exceedingly broad" because the notification 
260 [d. 
261 [d. at 991·93. 
262 [d. at 991. 
263 [d. at 991. 
264 Dtte, 259 F.3d at 992-93. See also Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082. Specifically the 
Washington statute only allowed dissemination of sex offenders' personal information 
within a narrow geographic area. [d. 
265 Dtte, 259 F.3d at 992. The Court noted that all Federal Court of Appeals have 
upheld registration and notification statutes that are tailored to the risk of the sex 
offenders with the exception of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Femedeer v. Haun, 227 
F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000). In Russell, the court considered "evidence of the offender's 
future dangerousness, likelihood of re-offending or threat to community to justify 
disclosure to the public." 
266 [d. 
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provisions allowed access to information worldwide over the 
Internet.267 The powerlessness of law enforcement authorities 
to limit the widespread public distribution of this information 
under the Act demonstrates the exceedingly broad nature of 
the Act.26B The court stated that ''broadcasting the information 
about all past sex offenders on the Internet does not in any way 
limit its dissemination to those whom the particular offender is 
of concern."269 Accordingly, the court concluded that under this 
factor the Act was punitive.270 
The Court analyzed the Mendoza-Martinez criteria and 
found that the Act's effects were excessively punitive in 
comparison to any non-punitive intent alleged by the 
legislature. In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on 
the excessive registration requirements, the fact that the Act 
applied only to behavior that was already a crime, the 
retributive aspects of the registration requirements and the 
imposition of substantial disabilities and restraints on the 
offender.271 Although the Act was not punitive in every respect, 
the Act taken as a whole was excessively punitive in relation to 
the purpose of community protection.272 Thus, the court held 
that the Act violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and was invalid. 
In addition to the Ex Post Facto Clause violations, the 
plaintiffs raised other constitutional challenges. The plaintiffs 
also claimed that the Act violated their Due Process and 
privacy rights.273 The court acknowledged that the Act ''brands 
sex offenders without any attempts to classify them by the risk 
posed" and denies them an opportunity to prove rehabilitation. 
The court strongly suggested that the plaintiffs Due Process 
challenges had merit, however, the court declined to address 
the Due Process challenge because of its holding that the Act 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
267 [d. 
268 [d. 
269 Otte, 259 F.3d at 992. 
270 [d. 
27\ [d. at 993·95. 
272 [d. 
273 [d. Jane Doe also challenged the Act as violating her right to privacy. [d. The 
court found that Jane Doe's privacy claim was taken care of by the finding of the Ex 
Post Facto Clause violation. [d. 
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V. CRITIQUE: PROPOSED SOLUTION: SUPERVISED 
PROBATION 
In Doe v. Otte,274 the Ninth Circuit properly found that the 
Alaska Act violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Act's 
excessive registration requirements and the unrestrained 
ability to post sex offenders' personal information on the 
Internet clearly punished sex offenders after the completion of 
their original sentences. What began as the regulation of sex 
offenders in order to protect our communities, has become a 
mechanism that deprives sex offenders, who have completed 
their original sentences and others who had been rehabilitated, 
of their constitutional rights. 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Alaska Act was 
enacted as a result of the pending release of a large number of 
sex offenders back into the community.275 Thus, the Act's 
requirements and notification provisions were the result of a 
knee-jerk276 reaction to a "crisis" that was never 
substantiated.277 Such hysteria leads to an overzealous 
attempt to ensure public safety, but results in the deprivation 
of the constitutional rights of the released sex offenders. 
Many factors must be considered in determining the most 
appropriate course of action to protect the public from sex 
offenders who are likely to reoffend. Once a sex offender 
completes his or her sentence, however, he or she should not be 
subjected to an excessive and indefinite term of punishment, 
which was not previously imposed by the trial court upon 
conviction. If an offender continues to pose a severe risk after 
being released, then the sentence may have been too light in 
the first place. 
The Circuits have recognized that the needs of the 
community must be balanced with the rights of the released 
sex offender. In order to accomplish this goal of community 
protection, sex offenders should be subject to a probation-like 
term, with definite timelines and guidelines, after completing 
their prison sentence. The sex offender should be made aware 
274 Id. 
275 Id. at 984. 
276 Knee-jerk is often associated with "liberals" but in this context is meant to refer 
merely to acting on preconceived, unsubstantiated ideas and stereotypes. 
277 Otte, 259 F.3d at 984. 
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of the requirements for probation upon sentencing in order to 
avoid any Ex Post Facto violations. The guidelines and 
timelines for probation should be decided by a board of 
experienced individuals, such as physicians, psychologists, 
social workers and law enforcement upon completion of the sex 
offender's initial sentence. The criteria for probation, such as 
threat to the community, rehabilitation and likelihood of 
recidivism, not the initial crime, should be based on a sliding 
scale. 
Megan's Law is meant to protect the community against 
this group of people. Thus, this great responsibility should not 
be put on the shoulders of the community that is ill equipped to 
handle this job due to the lack of training and access to 
accurate information. A period of probation, under the 
supervision and guidance of a trained officer, will place the 
burden of protecting communities on law enforcement, rather 
than on inexperienced citizens. The terms of supervised 
probation should be prospective and based on the sex offender's 
threat to the community upon release, the risk of recidivism, 
and whether or not the sex offender has been rehabilitated. 
Although requiring supervised probation for released sex 
offenders who fit into certain designated criteria might 
inundate the probation system, this is the best way of ensuring 
that those who continue to pose a threat to the community are 
supervised in an appropriate manner. Supervised probation is 
the only practical way to address public safety concerns. 
Supervised probation will address concerns of accountability 
through frequent contracts with trained professionals. This 
system will enable the released sex offender to obtain 
rehabilitative resources, but also violate those offenders who 
choose not to abide by the terms of probation. Thus, supervised 
probation is also the best way to balance the safety interests of 
the public against the rights of the released sex offender. 
Internet posting and excessive registration requirements 
cannot accomplish the goal of community protection. Internet 
posting merely advertises the presence of sex offenders but 
does not provide the community with the necessary tools to 
protect themselves from released sex offenders who might re-
offend. Additionally, requiring the released offender to register 
four times a year with law enforcement serves no purpose other 
than an address check for those who have been released. Thus, 
incarceration followed by supervised probation, only if the 
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released sex offender continues to pose a risk, is the best way to 
promote public safety. This huge responsibility of monitoring a 
group of people who are likely to re-offend should not be left to 
the watchful, untrained and unrestrained eyes of the 
community. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Otte,278 has brought greater 
attention to the real and potential deprivations of liberty 
interests under sex offender registration and notification 
provisions, especially those who have been rehabilitated or 
those who have a very low risk of re-offending. Unlike other 
Circuit Courts of Appeal that have reaffirmed state statutes 
broadening the provisions of Megan's Law, the Ninth Circuit 
reduced a state's ability to violate sex offenders' constitutional 
rights through excessively punitive registration and 
notification requirements. 
Public labeling of sex offenders might be socially effective 
because it sell newspapers and gets votes, not because it 
actually promotes public safety. While society has a right to be 
fearful of any criminal, including sex offenders, the monitoring 
of such a complex problem should not be turned over to 
untrained communities that are misinformed on recidivism, 
and that are more fixated on punishing released sex offenders 
than on curing the problem. The focus should be on protecting 
the public by using resources to structure a probation-like 
system that includes law enforcement supervision, not merely 
community supervision. 
Constant legal challenges to states' use of sex offender 
registration and notification statutes to protect the public, are 
important ways of ensuring that those sex offenders who have 
been rehabilitated or pose no threat are not subject to these 
laws. The community has a right not to be misinformed about 
the risks these people pose and the offenders have a right to be 
free from a classification as "Mr. Mo Lester" if they pose no 
threat to the community and their crime was a minor offense. 
Accurate classifications, and appropriate measures such as 
278 Otte, 259 F.3d at 979. 
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requiring supervised probation of sex offenders, will free up 
time and energy expended by law enforcement and allow them 
to concentrate on those offenders who pose the greatest threat 
to public safety. 
Some might argue that the risk sex offenders pose to the 
community is so grave that all measures should be taken to get 
the word out to the community about released sex offenders. 
However, the Ninth Circuit properly found that the Alaska Act 
imposed disabilities on registrants that were unnecessary and 
excessive in relation to what was necessary to protect the 
community and what was intended by the registration and 
notification provisions set forth by Congress in Megan's Law. 
The United States Supreme Court granted review of the 
OUe279 decision on February 19, 2002. While the nationwide 
trend is to define what states can do within the parameters of 
sex offender registration and notification provisions, the United 
States Supreme Court should not overrule OUe.280 Thus, even 
though increased punishment through excessive registration 
and notification requirements is politically seductive, the 
United States Supreme Court must stand firm in ensuring that 
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